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The past two decades have witnessed dramatic changes in international
financial marketplaces, including significant international expansion and
diversification of banking activities and operations, a relatively inflation-
prone and unpredictable world economic environment, and the emergence
of intense global competition among bank and nonbank financial inter-
mediaries. Each of these phenomena has placed strains on the capital
position of international banking institutions.I Attempts to meet these
capital strains have led to substantial product innovation, which, in turn,
has raised regulatory concerns over new and different risks being assumed
(on and off balance sheet) by such institutions and over the possible
adverse impact upon the "safety and soundness" of such institutions and
the distortion of prudent capital bases.
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1. See generally R. PECCHIOLI (FOR OECD), THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BANK-
ING: THE POLICY ISSUES (1983).
2. See generally Study Group Established by the Central Banks of the Group of Ten
Countries (Sam Y. Cross, Chair), Recent Innovations in International Banking (1986).
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Further, world economic conditions have resulted generally in a dete-
rioration of the asset quality of individual banking institutions-with a
concomitant increase in loan loss reserves, write-offs, reductions in earn-
ings and depletion in capital, and in the rise in financially troubled insti-
tutions. Moreover, the increase in global competition has strained the
financial and managerial resources of banking institutions and has under-
cut customary bank pricing and profit margins, thus exerting downward
pressure on institutional earnings and capital bases. 3 In addition there has
been a series of bank scandals or crises of international scope (including
Franklin National Bank, Herstatt Bankhaus, the Secondary Banking Cri-
sis in the United Kingdom, Ambrosiano in Italy, and Continental Illinois
in the United States), 4 each of which has served (along with the Third
World Debt Crisis) 5 as specific catalysts for reform of regulatory practices
in the prudential supervision area.
All the above factors have translated into government apprehensions
among the bank supervisors of the industrialized nations, which have
kindled broad regulatory attention to the capital adequacy of banking
institutions operating in the international area. Such concerns have rested
largely on policy concerns for facilitating the "safe and sound" devel-
opment of an international banking system through the promotion of sta-
bility and transparency within such a system, and through the maintenance
of competitive equality among international banking institutions. 6
Within the United States, during these same two decades, the bank
regulators were becoming more aware of the general deterioration of cap-
ital levels of U.S. banking institutions. In particular, as the magnitude of
the Third World Debt Crisis and its implications for these U.S. institutions
became apparent in 1982, capital adequacy went beyond the examination
level and was transformed into a core regulatory banking objective to
bolster the prudential supervision of banking institutions and the safety
and soundness of the banking system itself. 7 Further, the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA) gave statutory credence to capital
3. See generally R. PECCHIOLI (FOR OECD), PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION IN BANKING
(1987).
4. For discussion of these and certain other banking crises affecting prudential super-
vision developments for international banking activities, see R. DALE, THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 156-67 (1984).
5. On the Third World Debt Crisis, see, e.g., PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LENDING
AND RESCHEDULINGS (J. Norton ed. 1988).
6. For discussion of the policy, practical, and legal significance of the capital adequacy
issue, see Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for
Prudential Supervision ofBanking Activities, OHIO ST. L.J. (Spec. Symposium Winter 1989)
[hereinafter Capital Adequacy Standards]. This Current Development is derived in part
from section IV of that article.
7. For detailed discussion of and references on the historical role of bank capital ad-
equacy in U.S. regulatory practice from the 1930s through 1988, see Capital Adequacy
Standards, supra note 6, section Ill.
VOL. 23, NO. I
BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE 247
adequacy as a regulatory objective, 8 not only with respect to the inter-
national debt problem but also with respect to the U.S. domestic banking
system as a whole. 9 With the ILSA and the intervention of the United
States Congress, the capital adequacy issue was legitimized through leg-
islation, and, as such, it also became politicized (that is, of concern to
the federal political decision-makers).' 0 As a result of the new public
visibility and concern for the issue, the need for uniformity of and trans-
parency in developing capital adequacy standards, on the domestic and
international levels, became heightened. Also, as the public significance
of bank capital adequacy unfolded, so also did the multitude of complex-
ities involved in defining capital and its composition, in selecting a proper
measurement test, and in determining institutional coverage. These con-
cerns lent to a greater need for regulatory uniformity and transparency,
and in attaining this goal, to a greater degree of formal legalism in the
regulators' approaches. I "
The express direction of the ILSA for the domestic and international
convergence of capital adequacy standards evidenced the inseparability
between the domestic and international dimensions of this issue.' 2 This
interconnection had already been recognized by the bank regulators of
the major industrialized nations through the Basle Supervisors Commit-
tee, 13 which since the late 1970s had begun to foster multilateral efforts
to arrive at a convergence of capital adequacy standards among the leading
industrialized nations, and which has led to the issuance of the July 1988
Basle Report on bank capital adequacy. 14 This Current Development dis-
cusses the background leading to this issuance of the report, the subject-
matter of the report, and the Report's effect on national banking regulations.
I. Basle Supervisors Committee's Initial Efforts
In 1974, in the wake of significant international banking disruptions
such as the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in West Germany, 15 the Gov-
8. See Pub. L. No. 98-181, title IX, 975 Stat. 1278 (1983).
9. For the legislative history of the Act, see U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 1768, at 1913
et seq. (1983).
10. For further discussion of ILSA, see, e.g., Bench & Sables, International Lending
Supervision, II N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 427 (1986); Lichtenstein, The U.S. Response
to the International Debt Crises: The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 25
VA. J. OF INT'L L. 401 (1985).
1I. See Capital Adequacy Standards, supra note 6, sections V and VI.
12. See 12 U.S.C. § 3901 (congressional declaration of policy).
13. The formal name of the Committee is the "Basle Committee on Banking Regulations
and Supervisory Practices," the formation and purposes of which are discussed infra in
section 1.
14. See, e.g., Bank of England reports on developments in cooperation among banking
supervisory authorities, BIS Press Rev. No. 121 (June 26, 1981).
15. See supra note 4.
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ernors of the central banks of the member countries of the "Group of
Ten" of the OECD 16 (plus the governor of the central bank of Switzerland)
established, under the administrative auspices of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) in Basle, Switzerland, 17 the Committee on Bank-
ing Regulations and Supervisory Practices (Basle Supervisors Committee).
The membership of this Committee has come to comprise the represen-
tatives of the central banks and other authorities with formal responsibility
for the prudential supervision of banking institutions from these eleven
leading industrialized countries and from Luxembourg. 18 The Committee,
16. OECD stands for the Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development,
an international consultative organization which presently comprises twenty-four of the
principal western industrialized countries and which undertakes research and affords a forum
for high-level economic discussions for its members. See, e.g., R. EDWARDS, JR., INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 68 et seq. (1985).
The "Group of Ten," or G-10 Group, came about in 1974 as a consequence of the estab-
lishment in 1962 of the General Agreement to Borrow (GAB) pursuant to a decision of the
Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Group was informally
established with the support of the IMF, OECD, the Bank for International Settlement
(BIS), by the finance ministers of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Neth-
erlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States for the primary purpose of
intergovernmental consulting regarding implementation of calls upon the lines of credit
extended to the IMF under the GAB-the scope of such consultation being broadened over
the years. Subsequently, Switzerland has become an active member of the Group, rendering
the "G-10" designation a misnomer. The G-10 Group operates through the respective finance
ministers on the highest level, but also on specific subject matters through various ad hoc
committees (e.g., in banking through a committee of the central bank Governors of its
member states meeting ten times a year at the BIS, with these Governors and the finance
ministers and staffs from the IMF, BIS, and OECD also meeting several times a year within
Working Party No. 3 of the OECD's Economic Policy Committee). For further discussion
of GAB and G-10, see 11 J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS ch. 6 (1984).
17. On the BIS, see generally BIS THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS AND
THE BASLE MEETINGS (1980) (50th anniversary publication 1930-1980).
18. The institutions represented on the Basle Supervisors Committee are:
Belgium National Bank of Belgium
Banking Commission
Canada Bank of Canada
Office of the Inspector General of Banks
France Bank of France
Banking Commission
Germany Deutsche Bundesbank
Federal Banking Supervisory Office
Italy Bank of Italy
Japan Bank of Japan
Ministry of Finance
Luxembourg Luxembourg Monetary Institute
Netherlands The Netherlands Bank
Sweden Sveriges Riksbank
Royal Swedish Banking Inspectorate
Switzerland Swiss National Bank
Swiss Federal Banking Commission
United Kingdom Bank of England
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which operates without any extensive formal mandate or any constitution
or bylaws, meets regularly three or four times a year and serves as an
informal forum for on-going cooperation on bank prudential supervision
matters. 19
The Basle Supervisors Committee's primary aim is to encourage a grad-
ual convergence of bank supervisory practices of the member regulatory
institutions by enhancing the scope and effectiveness of supervisory tech-
niques for international banking activities, by studying and making rec-
ommendations on specific areas of prudential concern in international
banking, and by facilitating the exchange of information among bank
supervisors so as to upgrade the quality of international bank supervision.
Throughout its existence, the Committee has sought to maintain a low
profile, one that is informal, and where possible, nonpublicized. As noted
by the second chair of this Committee, Peter Cooke from the Bank of
England:20
The committee does not undertake a formal supernational supervisory role; its
conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal force. Rather
it formulates and recommends broad supervisory principles and guidelines of
best practices in the hope and expectation that individual authorities will take
steps to implement them through detailed arrangements-statutory or other-
wise-which are best suited to their own national systems. In this way the
committee encourages some gradual convergence towards a common approach
and common standards without attempting far reaching harmonization of mem-
ber countries supervisory techniques.
Notwithstanding the disclaimer of Mr. Cooke, the Basle Supervisors
Committee has in fact had a legally significant impact upon international
bank supervision in a number of ways. 21 For example, in 1975, the Com-
mittee prepared a paper (subsequently known as the Concordat), which pro-
United States Federal Reserve Board
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Secretariat Bank for International Settlements
19. Reference to the founding mandate for the Committee from the Governors of the
central banks of the G-10 countries is a Press Communiqud of the G-10 central bank Gov-
ernors of Feb. 12, 1975, issued through the BIS. Since 1982, the Secretariat of the Committee
has endeavored to prepare an annual Report on International Developments in Banking
Supervision, which summarizes the work of the Committee.
20. See discussion of the role of the Committee by W. P. Cooke, the Chair of the Com-
mittee, in Basle Supervisors Committee (June 21, 1984) (Committee document for external
distribution).
21. The term "legally significant," as used in this Current Development, is used to
connote not only formally enacted or derived legal rules, but also acts (though not formally
enacted or derived) that may nevertheless have the capacity to generate legal rules, to effect
formal institutional or administrative changes, to affect private or public transactions, or to
influence the decision-making process of judicial or regulatory authorities.
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posed guidelines for the respective responsibilities of different bank
supervisory authorities regarding the supervision of banks where those ent-
ities were operating in more than one national jurisdiction. The Concordat
set forth the principle of consolidated supervision (that is, the supervision
of foreign banking establishments is the joint responsibility of parent and
host authorities) in the hope of closing supervisory gaps respecting inter-
national banking operations. No foreign banking establishment should es-
cape supervision, so each country needs to ensure that such establishments
are supervised. For instance, in the case ofjoint ventures, the host authority
is effectively the only authority able to exercise supervision.
22
In particular, the 1975 Concordat stated that the primary responsibility
for the supervision of the liquidity of foreign banking establishments was
that of the authority of the country in which the foreign bank operated
(the host country), although it was a matter of more limited concern for
the authority responsible for supervising the parent bank where currency
of a parent authority is involved. As to matters of solvency, the primary
supervisory responsibility for subsidiaries and joint ventures rested with
the host authorities. Nevertheless, the parent authorities were to take
account of the parent bank's moral commitment to those foreign estab-
lishments. With respect to bank branches overseas, the primary respon-
sibility for supervision was to remain with the parent authorities. The
Concordat also suggested a number of areas of practical cooperation among
supervisory authorities. These areas included direct transfers of infor-
mation (with efforts to remove any national constraints, such as bank
secrecy laws), direct inspections by parent authorities on the territory of
the host authority, and indirect inspections by host authorities at the
request of parent authorities. 23
The Concordat, while circulated worldwide to bank supervisory au-
thorities, did not come to the public attention until the early 1980s. At
that time, the Basle Supervisors Committee (spurred on by the Ambro-
siano bank'scandal in Italy) was also preparing a revision of the Concordat,
which was completed in June 1983 (Revised Concordat). The Committee
circulated the Revised Concordat to commercial banks worldwide and
released the document to the public under the title, "Principles for the
supervision of banks' foreign establishments." ' 24
22. The first public appearance of the 1975 Concordat was as an Annex, Supervision of
Banks' Foreign Establishments, to R. WILLIAMS & G. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS, 1981, at 29-32 (IMF
Occasional Paper No. 7, 1981).
23. Id. at 30-32.
24. A copy of the 1983 Revised Concordat was published in 22 I.L.M. 900 (1983), with
an introductory note by F. R. Dahl of the U.S. Federal Reserve staff. For discussion of the
Ambrosiano bank scandal, see R. Dale, supra note 4.
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The Revised Concordat expanded upon the 1975 document and upon
a 1978 proposal of the Committee (endorsed by the Governors of the
central banks of the G-10 and Switzerland) that supervision of an inter-
national bank's capital adequacy-and risk exposure should also be mon-
itored on a consolidated basis. 25 Specifically, the 1983 document expressly
incorporated the 1978 proposal; clarified the importance of the roles for
both hosts and supervisory authorities respecting the supervision of li-
quidity of a bank's foreign establishments; reiterated the goal that no
international banking operation should escape effective supervision, while
suggesting various ways in which a supervisory gap can be prevented
(particularly with respect to holding companies and nonbanking compa-
nies as part of banking groups); and stressed that the Revised Concordat
addresses supervisory responsibilities and not those of a lender-of-last-
resort.26
Through the 1975 Concordat and its 1983 revised version, the Basle
Supervisors Committee had created the basis for reordering the jurisdic-
tional scheme among banking authorities from different jurisdictions deal-
ing with common international banking problems. While no international
banking system exists as a formal or legal entity and while the Committee's
Concordats were not written as legal documents, the effect has been that
the various member countries and others in fact have reformulated their
jurisdictional approaches to prudential supervision of international bank-
ing activities to align themselves with the principles of the Concordat. In
essence, the Concordats have given effect (in some instances, extrater-
ritorial) and legitimacy to what otherwise might have been questionable
extensions of legal jurisdiction by either parent or host country banking
authorities over a nondomestic subject matter or entity.
A second matter of legal significance respecting the Basle Supervisors
Committee's efforts has been its ability to create a worldwide forum for
discussion of bank prudential supervision problems, discussions that have
gone beyond the formal membership of the Committee. For example, the
Committee was the catalyst for the establishment of the biannual inter-
national conference of bank supervisors (ICBS), which was first held in
London in 1979.27 Moreover, the Committee has generated an offshore
group of bank supervisors, a commission of Latin American and Carib-
25. See Cooke, The Basle "Concordat" on the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Estab-
lishments, 39 AUSSENWIRTSHAFT 151, 153 (1984).
26. For discussion of the Revised Concordat, see generally id.
27. The second ICBS (1981) was held in Washington, D.C., the third in Rome (1984),
the fourth in Amsterdam (1986), and the fifth in Tokyo (1988). The banking authorities' host
country of each conference maintains copies of the conference proceedings, and the Sec-
retariat of the Basle Supervisors Committee maintains the cumulative copies of these
proceedings.
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bean banking supervisory and inspection organizations, and a SEANZA
(Southeast Asia, New Zealand, and Australia) organization of banking
supervisors. 28 Further, the Committee has established close links with
the Contact Group of the European Community bank supervisory au-
thorities and with the European Community's Banking Advisory
Committee.29
Thus, the Basle Supervisors Committee, although not a formal inter-
national organization in an international law context, has taken on the
aura and reality of a substantive and permanent international forum that
has been a centrifugal force for creating a worldwide network for the
exchange of information and the discussion of issues regarding bank pru-
dential supervision. The Committee has created the possibilities and con-
ditions for an evolutionary international convergence of prudential
supervisory practices and standards.
For present purposes, the key legal significance of the Basle Supervisors
Committee has been its pronouncements and activities in the capital ad-
equacy area. This legal significance manifests itself in its potential for law
generation within the jurisdictions of its members. The Committee has
not only generated significant legal actions within its members' legal and
supervisory systems, but it has helped move forward and shape the con-
tent of such national actions through the convergence process. 30
With respect to capital adequacy, the Committee expressed its view in
1978 that the principle of consolidated supervision should be applicable
to this area of bank prudential supervision. In 1981, the member insti-
tutions of the Committee were concerned increasingly with the continuing
erosion of bank capital on a worldwide basis and commenced the prep-
aration of a report to the G-10 central bank Governors respecting bank
capital adequacy in relation to the international business of banks. The
Committee was of the view that further erosion of bank capital ratios was
undesirable and that, in principle, it was desirable to achieve a greater
approximation in the levels of capital employed by major international
banks. While realizing that it was not its role to attempt any formal legal
harmonization of capital adequacy standards internationally, the Com-
28. The annual Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision by the
Basle Supervisors Committee generally contains a summary of cooperative effort being
made by these various groups.
29. See generally M. DASSESSE & S. ISAACS, EEC BANKING LAW (1985); Norton, The
Convergence of Banking Laws and Standards Within the European Community: An Example
of the Efficacy of Emerging International Banking Law, to be published in 23 INT'L LAW.
(Fall 1989), as part of afestschrift for Sir Joseph Gold.
30. See discussion infra section IV.
VOL. 23, NO. I
BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE 253
mittee did view its role as trying to achieve a "greater convergence among
its members with regard to national definitions of bank capital for super-
visory purposes."
3 1
In June of 1982, the Basle Supervisors Committee presented a paper
to the central bank Governors, who endorsed the Committee's main con-
clusions, which were: "that in the current and prospective environment
further erosion of capital ratio should, on prudential grounds, be resisted;
and that, in the absence of common standards of capital adequacy, su-
pervisors should not allow the capital resources of their major banks to
deteriorate from their present level, whatever those levels may be." 32
The main thrust behind these conclusions was prudential concern for the
fundamental safety and soundness of the major international banks and
of the international financial system.
The Basle Supervisors Committee's 1982 report also set out an agenda
for further work in the capital adequacy areas. The Committee would
continue to work toward achieving a "common view" among its member
institutions regarding the main constituent elements of capital, with par-
ticular focus on the nature and role of subordinated debt instruments and
"hidden reserves." Further, the Committee would examine different ra-
tios that relate balance sheet items to capital, including risk asset ratios,
gearing ratios, and large loan exposure ratios. The Committee hoped
eventually to evaluate the usefulness of these different ratios for different
purposes and to make specific recommendations for the application of
such ratios for prudential supervision purposes by its member institutions. 3
3
For two years the Basle Supervisors Committee continued its work on
capital adequacy, but became increasingly conscious of the diversity of
national systems' capital measurements and the difficulties of devising
meaningful and acceptable common standards. In addition, the Committee
began to focus on capital adequacy not only in terms of stability of the
international financial system but also in competitive equality terms.
34
The Basle Supervisors Committee was also particularly influenced by
the enactment of the ILSA in the United States and the subsequent con-
cern of the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board to pursue these
matters internationally within the Basle Supervisors Committee struc-
31. See BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN BANKING SUPERVISION 1981, at 7 (1982).
32. See BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN BANKING SUPERVISION 1982, at 3 (1983).
33. Id. at 4.
34. See BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN BANKING SUPERVISION 1984, at 8-15 (1985), [hereinafter 1984 REPORT].
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ture. 35 In fact, in 1984, the G-10 central bank Governors approved further
work toward a framework of "functional equivalents" of capital mea-
surement that might be devised to overcome national differences and to
make possible development, in due course, of commonly agreed quanti-
tative measures of capital adequacy.
36
By the end of the summer of 1984, the Basle Supervisors Committee,
in undertaking this task, linked its efforts closely with those of the Eu-
ropean Community's Bank Advisory Committee, which was engaged in
similar work in the context of European Community integration initiatives
in the banking area. The reason for this linkage was that many of the
members of the European Community were also members of the Com-
mittee; therefore, divergent approaches by these two groups would only
prove counterproductive. Thus, by the end of 1984, the Basle Supervisors
Committee was concentrating its efforts on developing a common defi-
nition of capital and common capital adequacy assessment methods. 37
At the end of 1986, the Basle Supervisors Committee had formulated
a complex definition of capital based upon a six-tier system. The first tier
comprised permanent shareholders equity, retained earnings, and dis-
closed reserves. The other tiers progressively added additional elements
accepted as part of capital by some but not all of the member states of
the Committee. For example, tier two added undisclosed reserves; tier
three, perpetual and certain other hybrid capital instruments; tier four,
asset reevaluation reserves; tier five, general provisions; and tier six,
subordinated debt. In addition, the Committee attempted to evaluate the
value of a simple gearing ratio vis- -vis a risk asset ratio. Although the
Committee had concluded that the risk asset approach represented "a
more sensitive and reliable test of capital adequacy than the gearing ap-
proach," the framework being developed by the Committee was to include
both approaches in separate sets of calculations. With respect to the rating
of assets and off balance sheet items for the risk asset test, the Committee
had segregated seven broad categories of assets with percentage ratios
being 0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, or 100 percent. 38
In addition to its work on consolidated supervision and capital ade-
quacy, 39 the Basle Supervisors Committee has issued consultative papers
and conclusions touching upon related matters such as foreign exchange
35. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
36. See 1984 REPORT, supra note 34, at 9.
37. Id. at 10-12.
38. See BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE, REPORT No. 5 ON INTERNATIONAL DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN BANKING SUPERVISION 10-27 (1986).
39. On subsequent Committee work on consolidation, see Basle Supervisors Committee
and Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, "The implementation of the Basle Concordat:
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positions, 40 bank secrecy, 4 1 country risk analysis, 42 and off balance sheet
risks. 43 None of these documents purports to be prescriptive; they are
intended to serve as recommendations and guidelines to be evaluated by
the member institutions and by other bank regulators outside the group.
While any subsequent implementation remains within the discretion of
the national authorities, these documents have been influential in assisting
the national supervisors address these issues within their respective
systems.
1i. An Intervening Catalyst: The U.S./U.K. Accord
Although the Basle Supervisors Committee was making substantial
progress on formulating acceptable international capital adequacy stan-
dards, this progress apparently was not sufficient for the U.S. bank reg-
ulators, particularly for the Federal Reserve Board. The Federal Reserve
felt strongly that the United States Congress had established a firm man-
date to work toward the convergence of international capital adequacy
standards. In addition, on a practical level, the Federal Reserve was
becoming more perplexed and pressed in dealing with foreign bank ac-
quisition applications in the United States, and more specifically, with
trying to evaluate the capital bases of Japanese banking institutions. 4 4
Accordingly, sometime during 1986 (particularly the latter part thereof),
private bilateral discussions began and intensified between the Federal
Reserve Board and also the staffs of the Comptroller and the FDIC on
the one hand and the Bank of England on the other hand. These discus-
sions were conducted outside the framework of the Basle Supervisors
Committee. 45 One linkage making possible this collaboration was that in
formulating its earlier 1986 risk-based capital proposals the Federal Re-
Practical aspects of international collaboration between banking supervisory authorities"
(Aug. 1987). For discussion of recent Committee work on capital adequacy, see infra section
III.
40. See Basle Supervisors Committee, "Supervision of banks' foreign exchange posi-
tions" (Aug. 1980).
41. See Basle Supervisors Committee, "Banking secrecy and international co-operation
in banking supervision" (Aug. 1981).
42. See Basle Supervisors Committee, "Management of banks' international lending:
country risk analysis and country exposure measurement and control" (Mar. 1982).
43. See Basle Supervisors Committee, "The management of banks' off-balance-sheet
exposures, a supervisory perspective" (Mar. 1986). A copy of the document, with intro-
ductory note by C. Liechtenstein is contained at 25 I.L.M. 987 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Holland, Foreign Bank Capital and the United States Federal Reserve
Board, 20 INT'L LAW. 786 (1986).
45. On the historical backdrop to the U.S./U.K. Accord, see Bardos, The Risk-Based
Capital Agreement: A Further Step Towards Policy Convergence," FED. RES. BD. OF N.Y.
Q. REV. 26, 27-28 (Winter 1987-88).
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serve Board had considered and was familiar with the risk-based capital
approach of the Bank of England. 46 The Bank of England had developed
this nonlegal regulatory approach in 1980 and had been utilizing it as an
integral part of its prudential supervision procedures.
47
The fruit borne of this informal bilateral collaboration was an "Agreed
proposal of the United States federal banking supervisory authorities and
the Bank of England on primary capital and capital adequacy assessment,"
released on January 8, 1987 (U.S./U.K. Accord). In legal terms, this
Accord was a nonbinding document in any international or domestic sense.
While the banking authorities clearly had authority to promulgate equiv-
alent domestic regulations, there was no legal basis, as such, to create a
legally binding agreement among the bank supervisory authorities of these
nations. In fact, the Accord does not purport to be a legal document at
all: it is presented as a consultative paper "to serve as a basis for con-
sultation with the banking industry and others in the United States and
the United Kingdom." The Accord was also designed "to promote the
convergence of supervisory policy and capital adequacy assessments among
countries with major banking centers."
48
Looked at strategically, the U.S./U.K. Accord appears conceived as a
stimulus for prompt agreement on capital adequacy within the Basle Su-
pervisors Committee (and in particular, to pressure recalcitrant countries
such as Japan). The fallback position was that the United States and the
United Kingdom would proceed with international convergence on a bi-
lateral (or, if Japanese agreement could be reached, trilateral) basis in the
event the Basle Supervisory Committee did not reach prompt agreement.
The U.S./U.K. Accord also had the effect of resolving, at least bilat-
erally, some of the difficult particulars involved in the convergence pro-
cess being addressed by the Basle Supervisors Committee membership:
issues such as, the definition of capital in light of the specific and variant
financial, accounting, and governmental practices among certain of the
industrialized countries involved, and the risk weight formula to be adopted.
The bilateral agreement was to take effect in May 1987, after a period of
comment in each country.
The U.S./U.K. Accord proposed a common definition of the primary
capital base of a banking institution; the deductions to be made from
primary capital in computing the capital base for the risk asset ratio cal-
culation; the weighting structure of risk assets and off balance sheet ac-
46. See 51 Fed. Reg. 3976 (Jan. 31, 1986).
47. See Bank of England, Measurement of Capital (Sept. 1980).
48. For a copy of the Accord, see BIS REV. No. 43 (Mar. 3, 1987); BANK OF ENGLAND
Q. BULL. (Feb. 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 5135 (Feb. 19, 1987).
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tivities; and the agreement in principle on the use for supervisory purposes
of a ratio of primary capital to weight its risk assets. On this latter point,
the Accord did not set any precise figure but contemplated that the U.S.
and U.K. bank regulators would arrive at minimum common risk-asset
ratios and would make these ratios known publicly.49
Under this bilateral Accord, primary capital, which is viewed as the
highest quality bank capital for absorbing current losses, would comprise
two classes of capital funds: "base primary capital" and "limited primary
capital." The "base primary capital," which would receive full treatment
as primary capital, would include common stock, capital surplus, retained
earnings, minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries, general reserves
charged earnings, and hidden reserves comprising undisclosed retained
earnings (which was applicable in the United Kingdom and which would
be eventually phased out). "Limited primary capital," which could not
exceed 50 percent of the primary based capital less intangible assets, was
to include perpetual preferred stock (or preferred stock having an original
maturity date of at least twenty-five years) and qualified subordinated
debt (including perpetual debt). Adjustments to capital would include all
intangible assets, deductions of investments in unconsolidated subsidiar-
ies and associated companies (including unconsolidated joint ventures),
and deductions of bank holdings of capital instruments of other banking
institutions. 50
With respect to the rating of risk assets, the Accord would create five
weighted categories of 0 percent, 10 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, and
100 percent, based on perceived credit risks in such categories. Assets
in the 0 percent class, reflecting no significant risk, were to include vault
cash and claims on the domestic central bank; the 10 percent class included
short-term claims of international governments or government agencies;
the 25 percent group included risk assets such as short-term claims on
domestic or foreign banking institutions and government guaranteed loans;
the 50 percent group included claims on domestic national government
sponsored agencies and claims on multinational development institutions,
and all domestic and local domestic government general obligation claims;
and the 100 percent category, involving the greatest degree of long-term
risk, included long-term (over one year) claims on domestic depository
49. For further discussion of the Accord see, e.g., Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chair-
man, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on
General Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, April 30, 1987, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 435 (1987);
Murray-Jones & Spencer, The U.S./U.K. Proposal on Capital Adequacy, INT'L FIN. L.
REV. 27 (Sept. 1987); Mintz, International Banking: United States-United Kingdom Capital
Adequacy Agreement, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 498 (1987).
50. See 52 Fed. Reg. 5135, 5135-36, 5138-39 (Feb. 19, 1987).
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institutions of foreign banks, most claims on foreign governments, cus-
tomer liability on acceptances outstanding involving standard risk obli-
gors, domestic state and local revenue and industrial development bonds,
net open positions of foreign exchange, and all other assets. Off balance
sheet items would also be given specific risk rates and would be accord-
ingly given equivalent treatment with comparable on balance sheet equiv-
alents. For example, direct credit substitutes would receive a 100 percent
credit conversion factor; trade contingencies, a 50 percent credit con-
version factor; sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with re-
course, a 100 percent conversion factor; and other commitments such as
overdrafts, revolving underwriting facilities, underwriting commitments,
and commercial and consumer credit lines would receive a 10 percent
weight for instruments of one year and less original maturity, 25 percent
for over one to five years original maturity, and 50 percent for over five
years original maturity. A conversion factor for interest rate swaps and
foreign exchange rate contracts was to be determined in the future. 51
The Bank of England and the U.S. bank regulators made clear that the
new proposed risk-based capital standards would be applied "in tandem"
with the pre-existing capital requirements. For example, in the United
States, the capital-to-total assets ratio would still be employed. 52
The U.S./U.K. Accord led to the Federal Reserve Board's revising its
January 1986 risk-based proposal in the form of a new February 1987
capital adequacy proposal that substantially comported with U.S./U.K.
proposal. 53 The greatest significance of the bilateral Accord, however,
was that, whether rightly or wrongly, it added pressure to the Basle Su-
pervisors Committee process, which resulted in the issuance of its joint
capital adequacy proposal in December 1987. 54 The U.S./U.K. Accord
never was to be given effect.
Whether the bilateral U.S./U.K. efforts were constructive is open to
debate. Some view the process as a catalyst for accelerating the efforts
of the Basle Supervisors Committee, which appeared to have become
bogged down in the details and complexities of differences of treatment
of capital by the various member countries. 55 Others indicate that the
December 1987 Basle Committee proposals would have come about in
any event and that the intervening pressures from the U.S./U.K. proposal
51. Id. at 5138.
52. See 52 Fed. Reg. 5119, 5120 (Feb. 19, 1987).
53. See 52 Fed. Reg. 5119 (Feb. 19, 1987).
54. See Basle Supervisors Committee (Consultative Paper), "Proposals for international
convergence of capital measurements and capital standards" (Dec. 1987).
55. See, e.g., Bardos, supra note 45, at 28.
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only aggravated the difficulties of bringing about a common proposal. For
example, as indicated by Dr. Markus Lusser, Vice Chairman of the gov-
erning board of the Swiss National Bank: 56
The two countries [the United States and the United Kingdom]-the homes of
the two largest financial centres in the world-have agreed to a joint approach
in defining the capital of banks, laying down a system for valuing banks' assets
including off-balance-sheet operations and allocating them to specific categories
or risk. As a next step, they are trying to reach agreement with Japan. This
would cover the three most important financial centres in the world. Countries
not prepared to join an agreement among this group of three countries could
easily be put under pressure. It would be sufficient to bar their banks from
using the three financial centres or to subject them to special treatment there.
If they wish to remain competitive internationally, the large banks that operate
worldwide can no longer be absent from these centres today. They would quickly
try to encourage their governments to co-operate internationally.
At least as the representative of a small country the agreement between the
United Kingdom and the United States arouses somewhat mixed feelings. My
skepticism-and this I would like to emphasise-is not directed at the content
of the agreement. It brings about an international harmonisation with respect
to banks' capital adequacy that is very desirable. Moreover, my country is not
directly affected. As far as the amount of required own funds is concerned,
Swiss supervisory legislation goes further in any case than the new Anglo-
American agreement. My skepticism is directed solely at the approach which
was adopted.
In the light of the urgency of the problem, the pressure originating from the
agreement between the two countries to come to an accord in the concrete case
of regulations on capital adequacy is acceptable. However, should the example
set a precedent and the strategy of the two powers be extended to other fields
of harmonising banking supervision-as a substitute, so to speak, for interna-
tionally negotiated compromises-then the willingness to co-operate interna-
tionally could suffer damage in the long run. In view of the problems that need
to be solved, this would be a harmful development.
III. The July 1988 Report
In December of 1987 the Basle Supervisors Committee issued its "Con-
sultative Paper" on "Proposals for international convergence of capital
measurements and capital standards." 57 This proposal sets forth a com-
mon framework of capital adequacy measurement and a common mini-
mum target capital standard to be achieved and maintained by banks
operating internationally. In broad terms, there was general similarity
between the December 1987 Basle Committee Proposal and the U.S./
U.K. Accord. The Committee's proposal made distinctions between core
56. See Dr. Lusser assesses various aspects of international co-operation in the field of
monetary policy, BIS REV. No. 64, at 6 (Apr. 1, 1987).
57. See note 54 supra.
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capital components and other supplemental capital elements; provided
broad categories of weighted risk assets; provided an equivalent risk as-
sessment of off balance sheet items; and recognized that the proposed
risk-based capital standards were only one step in overall evaluations of
a banking institution's capital adequacy and financial soundness.
58
Nevertheless, the December 1987 Basle Supervisors Committee's Pro-
posal differed in a number of significant ways from the prior U.S./U.K.
Accord. For example, although both proposals treat the capital structure
on a two-tier level (core and supplemental capital), the Basle Proposal
provides that, after a transitional period, the core capital tier would be
comprised solely of common stockholders equity (including retained earn-
ings and minority interest in the common equity accounts of consolidated
subsidiaries). Allowance for loan and lease losses (general loan loss re-
serves) would not be included in core capital: the Basle Proposal assigns
general loan loss reserves to the tier two supplemental capital elements,
and phases in limitations on revaluation reserves. Further, the Basle Pro-
posal requires only a deduction of goodwill from capital. Other intangible
assets such as purchase mortgage servicing rights would not necessarily
be deducted in calculating the risk-based capital ratio: the national au-
thorities would be given discretion in the treatment of these other intan-
gible items. 5
9
Another significant difference between the two proposals is the role of
subordinated debt, which was not included in the U.S./U.K. capital def-
inition. Under the Basle Proposal, however, term subordinated debt, along
with intermediate-term limited life preferred stock, may be included in
the supplemental capital tier up to an amount equal to 50 percent of core
capital. 60
Also, the risk rating framework of the December 1987 Basle Proposal
varies in a number of ways from the U.S./U.K. structure. Government
securities with remaining maturities of ninety-one days or less would be
assigned a 0 percent risk category rather than being placed in the 10
percent category. All other U.S. government and agency obligations would
be assigned to the 10 percent risk category; the weight of short-term bank
claims is reduced from 25 percent to 20 percent; the risk weight of se-
curities issued by U.S. government sponsored agencies and general ob-
ligations of U.S. local governments is reduced from 50 percent to 20
58. For discussion of the December 1987 Basle Committee Proposal, see Comptroller
of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board and FDIC, Joint Inter-Agency Preamble on Risk-
Based Capital Proposal, 52 Fed. Reg. 8550 (Mar. 15, 1988).
59. See Basle Supervisors Committee (Consultative Paper), supra note 54, part I and
annex I.
60. Id. para. 20.
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percent; the risk rate for short-term commitments is reduced to 0 percent;
the weight for self-liquidating trade related contingencies such as com-
mercial letters of credit is reduced from 50 percent to 20 percent; and
portions of assets backed by the full faith and credit of domestic depository
institutions is assigned a 20 percent weight. 61 Further, the procedures for
determining capital requirements for interest rate swaps and foreign ex-
change rates is simplified, and their respective capital requirements are
reduced.62
The Basle Supervisors Committee's December 1987 Proposal estab-
lished on explicit schedule for achieving a minimum level of capital to
weighted risk assets by the end of the transition. By the end of 1990, a
target risk-based ratio of 7.25 percent (of which 3.25 percent percentage
points must be in the form of core capital) was called for. By the end of
1992, a minimum standard of 8 percent (of which at least four percentage
points must be in the form of core capital) is required.
63
After a six-month period of comment, the Basle Supervisors Committee
promulgated its final risk-based capital adequacy report in July 1988. 64
The July 1988 Report substantially paralleled the earlier December 1987
document, although it contained several major changes. For example,
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock is to be included in the definition
of tier one core capital. 65 In addition, the Committee indicated that if it
could establish clear guidelines to distinguish general from specific re-
serves, then such general reserves would be includable within the sup-
plemental tier two capital category without limits; however, if such
agreement is not reached, then the general reserves would be included in
tier two on a limited basis as originally proposed. 66 The July revision also
clarifies that term debt instruments must have a minimum original term
of maturity of over five years. 67 Further, the July 1988 Report assigns
reduced risk rates to a defined group of OECD member nations and those
that have concluded special ending arrangements with the IMF under its
general arrangement to borrow. 68 Also, the preferential 50 percent risk
rate for home mortgages on owner-occupied housing is extended to cover
loans secured by mortgages on rental housing. 69
61. Id. part II and annex 2.
62. Id. para. 42 and annex 3.
63. Id. parts III and IV.
64. See Basle Supervisors Committee, International Convergence of Capital Measure-
ment and Capital Standards (July 1988) [hereinafter July 1988 Basle Committee Report]. A
copy can be found at 51 BNA BANK. REP. 143 (July 25, 1988).
65. Id. para. 12.
66. Id. paras. 18-21.
67. Id. para. 23.
68. Id. paras. 33-37.
69. id. para. 41.
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In sum, the July 1988 Basle Committee's Report on bank capital ade-
quacy represents a comprehensive statement of the view of the Commit-
tee, which has been subsequently endorsed by the central bank Governors




While the Basle Supervisors Committee's July 1988 Report is presented
as a consultative paper, it has received the endorsement of the respective
bank supervisors of the member countries of the Committee and has been
formally endorsed by the G-10 central bank Governors. 71 As such, at least
on a political level, the respective government authorities of the member
states have agreed that the principles of the Report will be followed and
implemented, albeit the means of implementation through legal or ad-
ministrative mechanisms is left to the respective national authorities. The
Report clearly envisions some form of subsequent adaptation by national
authorities. In fact, national authorities have begun to act in reliance upon
the other authorities so acting. In this sense, the July 1988 Report can be
seen, at least analogously, as a form of "soft law" in that the formulators
of the principles embodied in the July 1988 proposals intend these prin-
ciples to be observed and to be implemented within their respective na-
tional jurisdictions (although perhaps through different legal and nonlegal
means). 72
In countries such as the United States and Germany and within the
European Community, the principles of the Basle Supervisory Commit-
tee's capital adequacy proposal will be enacted through formal legal means.
For example, the U.S. banking agencies have already begun the process,
at the time of this writing, for formulating new capital adequacy proposals
70. For discussion of the July 1988 Basle Committee Report, see Federal Reserve Board,
Staff Summary and Recommendations on Risk-Based Capital Plan, a copy of which is at
51 BANK. REP. 232 (Aug. 8, 1988).
71. See July 1988 Basle Committee Report, supra note 64, para. 1.
72. C.f. discussions of "soft law" by Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises, 22 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. It (1979); Gold, Strengthening the
Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT. L. 444 (1983); Seidl-
Hohenveldern, International Economic "Soft Law," 163 RECUEIL DES COURS (HAGUE),
Part I1, at 169 (1979). Indeed, one author (albeit, with minimal supporting authority) char-
acterizes the Committee's actions as a form of "international administrative law." Coing,
Das Basler Concordat von 1975 - ein Bertrag zur Entwicklung des internationales Verwalt
ungsrechts, in FESTSHCRIFr FUR FRANK VISCHER 123 (1983). The author is presently pre-
paring a detailed article discussing this and related issues of legal significance of the Basle
Supervisors Committee's actions.
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derived from and consistent with the July 1988 proposal. 73 Countries such
as the United Kingdom will probably continue not to embody these pro-
visions in any formal regulation, but the Bank of England has issued a
public notice to the U.K. banking community as to its intent to implement
the Basle Supervisory Committee's proposal. 74
Thus, the Basle Supervisory Committee's July 1988 Report is proving
itself a major step in achieving the convergence of standards of national
bank supervisors respecting capital adequacy. Clearly, the Report will
have a direct and pervasive impact upon the uniform capital adequacy
regulations to be adopted in the near future by the U.S. federal banking
authorities and by other banking authorities of the western industrialized
world.7
5
73. See, e.g., Regulators Negotiate Over Capital Rules, Final Action Not Expected Soon,
51 BNA BANK. REP. 422 (Sept. 12, 1988).
74. See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND, BANKING SUPERVISION DIVISION EXPLANATORY
PAPER No. 1/88, PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASURE-
MENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (Jan. 1988).
75. In conjunction with research being conducted at Keble College, Oxford University,
and at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, University of London, the author presently
is preparing a monograph on the work of the Basle Supervisors Committee, with particular
emphasis on its work in the capital adequacy area.
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